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This paper addresses the transmission of medical and context-aware data from mobile patients to healthcare centers over het-
erogeneous wireless networks. A handheld device, called personal wireless hub (PWH), of each mobile patient first gathers and
aggregates the vital sign and context-aware data for various telemedicine applications. PWH transmits the aggregated data to
the remote healthcare center over multiple wireless interfaces such as cellular, WLAN, and WiMAX. The aggregated data contain
both periodic data and those nonperiodic unpredictable emergency messages that are sporadic and delayintolerant. This paper
addresses the problem of providing QoS (e.g., minimum delay, suﬃcient data rate, acceptable blocking, and/or dropping rate) by
designing a packet scheduling and channel/network allocation algorithm over wireless networks. The proposed resource-eﬃcient
QoS mechanism is simple and collaborates with an adaptive security algorithm. The QoS and security are achieved mainly with
the collaboration of diﬀerentiator, delay monitor, data classifier, and scheduler modules within the PWH. This paper also discusses
secure data transmission over body sensor networks by introducing key establishment and management algorithms. Simulation
results show that the proposed framework achieves low-blocking probability, meets delay requirements, and provides energy-
eﬃcient secure communication for the combination of vital signs and context-aware data.
Copyright © 2008 Narasimha Challa et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Future generation wireless networks are expected to experi-
ence huge demands from mobile telemedicine applications.
Mobile telemedicine allows patients to do their daily activ-
ities while they are monitored continuously anytime, any-
where. Typical telemedicine applications include transmis-
sion of electro-cardiogram (ECG) signals from a mobile pa-
tient to a doctor, voice conversation between the doctor and
the personnel in the emergency vehicle, transmission of X-
rays, live video, and medical images from the emergency ve-
hicle or the patient to the doctor at the healthcare center.
These applications require communication between a mobile
patient and a healthcare center. Further, these telemedicine
applications have diﬀerent QoS requirements that are speci-
fied in terms of the desired loss rate, delay, and bandwidth.
Table 1 shows the typical telemedicine applications and their
QoS requirements [1]. Mobile telemedicine applications will
have to deal with the characteristics of wireless networks
such as low bandwidth, channel fluctuations, and coverage
changes. In addition, a single network alone may not be able
to meet the bandwidth requirements of applications at all lo-
cations. In this paper, the mobile applications are enabled to
take advantage of both the coverage and bandwidth provided
by diﬀerent wireless networks through multiple wireless in-
terfaces in achieving their QoS objectives.
An important characteristic of telemedicine data is the
diﬀerence in the periodicity and sporadic nature of the data.
When a patient is under good conditions, the vital sign data
of the patient are sent periodically to healthcare center to
monitor the condition of the patient. The periodic data may
consist of images, video, or audio. The exact constituents of
the periodic data are specified by the doctor based on the
patient’s condition. When the patient’s condition deterio-
rates, sporadic emergency data need to be sent to the health-
care center. The sporadic emergency data may be required to
transmit high-bandwidth images. Wireless bandwidth can be
reserved for periodic data because its amount and occurrence
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Table 1: QoS requirements.
Services Stream characteristic Delay sensitivity Data rate Delay Packet loss
Voice Continuous Delay sensitive 4–25 kbps 150–400 ms 3%
Diagnostic audio Continuous Delay sensitive 32–256 kbps 100–300 ms 1%
Video (normal quality) Continuous Delay sensitive 64 kbps–2 Mbps 150–400 ms —
Voice (high quality) Continuous Delay sensitive 3–15 Mbps 100–300 ms —
Signs (ECG) Continuous Delay sensitive 24 kbps/12 channels — —
Signs (heart rate) Continuous Delay sensitive 2–5 kbps 1s —
Signs (blood pressure) Continuous Delay sensitive 2–5 kbps — —
Images (uncompressed) Bursty Delay insensitive 30–40 Mb — —
Images (regional) Continuous Delay insensitive 10–20 Mb — —
time can be determined. However, reserving bandwidth for
emergency data is not eﬃcient in terms of resource usage. At
the same time, emergency data should be delivered on time
without delay. To solve this problem, our proposed scheme
diﬀerentiates the periodic data, and if the diﬀerences in the
periodic data exceed a threshold, patient’s personal wireless
hub (PWH) reserves bandwidth on the wireless networks in
order to ensure the availability of wireless bandwidth for the
emergency data. This scheme reduces the wastage of band-
width resources by not reserving bandwidth for emergency
data all the time. At the same time, by predicting the occur-
rence of an emergency situation and reserving resources be-
forehand based on the prediction, it improves the probability
of bandwidth availability under emergency situations.
In this paper, we consider the scenario of a mobile
telemedicine device that has multiple wireless interfaces and
that is capable of supporting multiple telemedicine applica-
tions. The mobile patient with a portable telemedicine de-
vice, called PWH in this paper, is considered to be in a low
mobility, densely populated area such as a shopping mall as
shown in Figure 1. The vital sign data of a mobile patient are
transmitted in wireless medium from the patient’s body sen-
sors to PWH, where the body sensors form a body sensor
network (BSN). In addition to body sensors, PWH is also
capable of communicating simultaneously with other net-
works such as wireless sensor network (WSN), cellular net-
work, and WLAN. Note that WSN provides context-aware
data (e.g., temperature, location, and humidity level) to the
patient’s PWH, which helps interpret accurately the patient
medical data. This paper addresses some security and/or
channel allocation/reservation aspects of data transmission
from body sensors to PWH (over BSN) as well as from PWH
to hospital data centers (over wireless networks).
The sensors implanted on the human body to monitor
parts of the body are called biosensors. These biosensors
form a network and collectively monitor the health condi-
tion of their carrier or host. Health monitoring involves col-
lection of data about vital body parameters known as bio-
metric signals or biometric data, from diﬀerent parts of the
body and making decisions based on them [2]. As seen from
Figure 1, remote patient monitoring uses body sensors to
sense vital sign data for performing real-time health moni-
toring of patients. Because the system involves transmission
of sensitive medical data, it should provide basic level of se-
curity. Key distribution is central to any security mechanism
based on cryptographic techniques. Symmetric key cryptog-
raphy requires establishment of a secret session key between
the communicating parties. Since biosensors are placed on
the human body, we can use them to derive the required
inputs for security mechanism from the body. The estab-
lishment of this session key should be designed to conserve
the limited energy resources of the body sensor. In this pa-
per, we proposes an energy eﬃcient secure key establishment
and authentication (SKEA) protocol to establish a symmet-
ric key between the body sensors and PWH using the bio-
metric signals (e.g., heart rate interval, blood flow) of pa-
tients. This eliminates the use of expensive key generating
functions and, therefore, the computational overhead is re-
duced.
Owing to its super-short communication range, the main
security challenges faced by BSN include the following: (i)
eavesdropping of data by a third party, unknown to the
source as well as the receiver and (ii) modification and injec-
tion of data by third party without knowledge of the source
and the destination. As sensors of BSN are expected to be in-
terconnected on or in the human body, the body itself can
form an inherently secure communication pathway that is
unavailable to all other kinds of wireless networks. Biomet-
rics recognition is based on “who you are” as opposed to/in
conjunction with “what you know” (PIN) or “what you have”
(ID card). The problem of eavesdropping and the problem of
interference between BSNs of diﬀerent individuals boil down
to one simple question: how can sensors or nodes of a BSN
know that they belong to the same individual? The answer
to this question lies in person’s physiological or behavioral
characteristics which can be used for identification and ver-
ification [3] purposes. It is desirable that all the nodes in a
BSN share the same session key to communicate with PWH.
Using traditional cryptographic techniques, it would be re-
quired to generate the session key at one node and then trans-
mit it to all other nodes. However, it is always preferred not
to transmit the actual key to be used over the network, even if
it is encrypted using some other key. In such a scenario, since
body sensors are placed on the same body, it becomes an at-
tractive proposition to derive the required inputs for security
mechanism from the body itself and to use the available bio-
metrics for forming the session key without transmission of
the actual session key over the network.





























Figure 1: A mobile patient can communicate with hospital data center and/or physician through wireless networks (e.g., cellular and sensor
networks), health grid station (HGS), and personal devices such as PWH.
A major concern with using biometrics for cryptographic
purposes is the degree of randomness. Unless the biometric
is random enough, an attacker can guess and compromise
it, leading the false acceptance rate to be increased, where the
false acceptance rate refers to the probability that the biomet-
ric security system allows an access attempt by an intruder.
The level of randomness of any quantity is defined by the
level of entropy [4]. The entropy can further be increased
using a combination of readings at more than one instance
of time because the search space is further increased. Some
candidate biometrics and their ranges are shown in Table 2
[2, 5]. The ranges are mentioned for normal as well as ab-
normal conditions.
The contributions of this paper include the following:
(i) a channel allocation and reservation algorithm that re-
serves bandwidth for emergency telemedicine data by mea-
suring the vital signs and predicting the status of the patient,
(ii) an adaptive priority and security assignment scheme to
meet the delay of emergency medical data, (iii) a dynamic
packet scheduling scheme that schedules packets on multiple
interfaces based on the instantaneous QoS requirements of
packets and channel conditions, and (iv) security algorithms
for key establishment, confidentiality, and authentication be-
tween body sensors and PWH. The proposed channel and
reservation algorithm diﬀers from existing work in that it
adapts the amount of resources reserved for emergency data
based on the variations in patient’s health conditions. In the
proposed adaptive priority and security assignment scheme,
when a patient is in critical situation, the strength of secu-
rity is increased in data transmission from the PWH to the
healthcare center if the patient is in good condition. A set of
modules such as the classifier, scheduler, and channel allo-
cator are used together to schedule packets of various appli-
cations through multiple interfaces and channels of diﬀerent
wireless networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the related work. Section 3 presents the system
model used in the paper. The proposed framework for adap-
tive secure channel allocation is presented in Section 4. The
call admission control algorithm that reduces the call drop-
ping probability of medical calls is presented in Section 5.
Section 6 presents the secure data transmission algorithm
over body sensor networks. The performance analysis is
presented in Section 7. Concluding remarks are made in
Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
Third generation (3G) and beyond cellular networks provide
support for multimedia data transmission [6]. For instance,
3G networks support a data rate of up to 144 kbps for ve-
hicular users and a data rate of up to 2 Mbps for pedestrian
users. In addition to providing higher data rates, 3G net-
works also have the advantage of providing continuous cov-
erage in both urban and rural areas. Therefore, they are well
suited for telemedicine applications that require continuous
connectivity (periodic data). However, one disadvantage of
3G networks is that in hot spot areas such as airports, shop-
ping malls, they may not have enough capacity to support
all users because of heavy loads. Therefore, allocating some
channels from alternative networks in hot spot areas would
be required.
WLANs provide a cheap and eﬀective alternative to
cellular networks in hot spot areas [7]. With the emer-
gence of technologies such as voice over WLAN, it is pos-
sible to maintain a voice call over a WLAN interface.
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Table 2: Candidate biometrics with their ranges.
Biometric Range
Blood glucose 64–140 mg/dL (varies with activity)
Blood pressure 120–160 mmHg (systolic) (range is from hypotension to hypertension)
Temperature 97.0–105.0 F (range across ages and normal and abnormal conditions)
Hemoglobin 12.1–17.2 g/dL (varies between male and female and age and altitude)
Blood flow
Greater than 0.9 ABI (normal)
Less than 0.5 ABI (abnormal)
Further, WLANs provide higher data rates of up to 54 Mbps
(802.11g). However, WLANs have very limited coverage.
IEEE 802.16/WiMAX technology provides broadband con-
nectivity in a wireless metropolitan area network (WMAN)
environment for to both fixed and mobile users [8]. To pro-
vide flexibility for diﬀerent applications, the standard sup-
ports two major deployment scenarios. In the last-mile sce-
nario, broadband wireless connectivity is provided to home
and business users in a WMAN environment. The operation
is based on a point-to-multipoint single-hop transmission
between a single base station (BS) and multiple subscriber
stations (SSs). Backhaul networks is a multihop (or mesh)
scenario where a WiMAX network works as a backhaul for
cellular networks to transport data/voice traﬃc from the cel-
lular edge to the core network (Internet) through meshing
among IEEE 802.16/WiMAX base stations.
A notion for QoS for telemedicine multimedia data is
presented in [9]. The authors elaborate on several synchro-
nization protocols to achieve key multimedia telemedicine
data synchronization requirements. In [10, 11], the telecom-
munication and QoS requirements of various telemedicine
applications are presented. They also discuss how various
technologies can be chosen to support the QoS require-
ments of telemedicine applications. But, they do not address
how the various technologies can be integrated to support
the QoS requirements of telemedicine applications. Integra-
tion of the networks is essential to support high bandwidth
telemedicine applications. In [12], the transmission of visual
sensor data is adapted based on the changes in patient’s state.
Bandwidth allocation for telemedicine applications and
bandwidth aggregation is addressed in [1, 13, 14] to en-
sure their QoS guarantees. However, these schemes do not
consider bandwidth aggregation over multiple wireless net-
works. In [15–21], the authors propose to take advantage
of bandwidth aggregation to meet the QoS requirements
of bandwidth intensive telemedicine applications when the
bandwidth of a single network is not suﬃcient to meet all
the QoS requirements. In [15], a packet scheduling scheme
where latency sensitive packets are sent over low latency
timeslots is presented. Also, in [17], only a random way to
find a schedule that maximizes the system utility is sug-
gested. Another scheduling algorithm, called Earliest Deliv-
ery Path First (EDPF) in [18], schedules each path on the ear-
liest delivery path, with the objective of reducing delay due
to reordering and hence the delay and jitter experienced by
the applications. The combination of Weighted Fair Queue-
ing (WFQ) with EDPF is presented in [19] to ensure a fair
share of the bandwidth among diﬀerent applications. How-
ever, they do not address the multiple class traﬃc scenario.
In [22], the authors propose a scheme to adapt the quality
and security of transmitted video based on the channel sta-
tus and patient status. Basically, a higher level encryption is
used when the patient’s status is urgent as compared to that
used when the patient’s status is normal. On the other hand,
a higher level compression scheme is used when the chan-
nel quality gets poorer. These approaches ensure that the de-
lay and the video quality of the telemedicine data are met in
all circumstances. However, in our paper, we do not modify
the security of the patient’s data even when the patient is in
urgent situation, since reducing the encryption strength can
aﬀect the reliability of the patient’s data.
In [20], the authors propose a QoS-Aware Wireless Band-
width Aggregation (QAWBA) scheme where mobile nodes
use multiple independent paths through other mobile nodes
to receive data from the base station. QAWBA integrates on-
demand proxy discovery, bandwidth reservation and mainte-
nance, and hop-by-hop routing to achieve this. The solution
proposed is specific to 802.11 networks and does not con-
sider heterogeneous networks. In [21], the presented scheme
does not consider traﬃc of diﬀerent traﬃc classes.
The ultimate aim of BSN is to provide a truly per-
sonalized monitoring platform that is pervasive, intelligent,
context-aware, and invisible to the patient, thereby avoid-
ing activity restriction or behavior modification. It should
be noted that it is required by law that individual biomet-
ric data are kept in privacy [23]. Most of the research in the
area of security for sensor networks is involved with generic
sensor networks [24], which is not applicable to body sen-
sor networks due to the fact that body sensors operate with
extremely stringent constraints. For medical care, a sensor
network platform is presented in [25], and the need for secu-
rity in medical environment is addressed by considering ECC
[26]. But all the security requirements are not adequately
presented. Their ECC implementation over binary field F2163
(i.e., key length of 163 bits) takes about 34.2 seconds to com-
pute a public-private key pair and another 32.4 seconds to
compute a shared key via ECDH [26].
Bao [27] discusses the use of biochannel to assist secure
transmission of privacy data. They assume an auto-shared
secret (ASS) which is generated network-wide. They use the
initialization key and the session key to complete a three-
step security model. Researchers recently developed random-
key predistribution protocols [28] which initially have a large
pool of symmetric keys, and a random subset of the pool is
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distributed to each sensor node. In this, there is no need for a
central authority but if an attacker compromises suﬃciently
many nodes, he could reconstruct the complete pool of keys
and break the scheme. The proposed SKEA scheme uses no
such pool and hence protects against such kind of attacks.
Undercoﬀer et al. [29] present a scheme similar to [30] with
the addition of addressing multihop communications. They
use diﬀerent keys to encrypt diﬀerent parts of the packet like
header and payload to ensure end-to-end security. Using dif-
ferent keys would incur overhead in terms of storage and
computation which is not the case in the scheme proposed in
this paper. Gupta et al. [31] create a web server implement-
ing an ECC version of SSL running on server motes. The re-
sults indicate that it takes less than 4 s to complete an entire
SSL handshake. However, this scheme uses ECDH to derive
a shared key, which requires both the client and the server to
have public keys. The work presented here does not assume
the same.
With the growth of personal area networking (WPAN)
technologies, the interest in healthcare monitoring, smart
homes, and similar applications has grown significantly. Zig-
Bee [32, 33] is the first industrial standard WPAN technology
that provides short range, low power, and low data rate com-
munication, and supports mesh networking and multihop-
ping. Most of the existing systems lack two key features: (i)
reliable wireless operation that conforms to standards, and
(2) compatibility with smart home systems [34]. Established
standards for wireless applications, such as Bluetooth and
IEEE 802.11, allow high-transmission rates, but at the ex-
pense of high power consumption, application complexity,
and cost. ZigBee networks, on the other hand, are primarily
intended for low duty-cycle sensors, those active for less than
1% of the time. ZigBee is best described by referring to the 7-
layer OSI model for layered communication systems. ZigBee
gives the freedom to the developers to build custom applica-
tions which use the services provided by the lower layers of
the 7-layer structure. It should be noted that the ZigBee uses
an already existing data link and physical layers specification
such as IEEE 802.15.4 standards for low-rate personal area
networks.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume that a number of body sensors forming a BSN
are attached to a patient. Each patient is equipped with a
portable device called PWH that is capable of gathering vi-
tal signs and context-aware data, processing and aggregat-
ing them, and transmitting them through its multiple wire-
less interfaces. PWH receives the context-aware data from
nonmedical body sensors and wireless stationary sensors de-
ployed in the area where patients roam. PWH is able to trans-
mit and receive data to/from hospital data center via various
wireless networks. PWH receives feedback from the wireless
interfaces about the channel conditions. Based on the pri-
ority of the applications and the channel conditions, PWH
schedules data packets on the appropriate interface so that
the QoS requirements are met. Hence, PWH performs many
operations including data aggregation, priority assignment,
packet scheduling, and rate control.
Within PWH, data packets are transmitted from multi-
ple application streams onto multiple wireless interfaces. We
assume that an application flow F consists of a set of m sub-
flows fi, denoted by F = f1 < f2 < · · · < fm, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
The subflow fi is transmitted only if those subflows whose
indices are smaller than i are transmitted. The subflow f1
provides the lowest quality for the application and each ad-
ditional subflow improves the quality of the application. The
rate requirements of the application can therefore be speci-
fied as R = r1 < r1 + r2 < · · · < r1 + r2 + · · · + rm, where
ri is the data rate requirement for subflow i. When the net-
work bandwidth is available, we provide the rate requirement
r1 + r2 + · · ·+ rm. When the network bandwidth is not avail-
able, we relax the rate requirement of the application. As for
security model, we consider a multilevel security model sim-
ilar to the one in [35]. Each security level corresponds to a
diﬀerent encryption and authentication scheme.
Though it is desirable to meet both the minimum de-
lay and maximum rate requirements at the same time, it is
not always possible to do so because of network load and
channel dynamics. Whenever the minimum delay cannot be
met for some subflows, the higher-order subflow need not
be transferred. This reduces the delay, but at the same time
reduces the quality of the application transmitted. Thus re-
ducing the rate reduces the delay and vice versa. Similarly,
reducing the security level reduces the delay encountered by
a packet. In this paper, we adapt the security level used for
transmission to meet the delay requirement of application in
situations where QoS is more important than quality of pro-
tection (QoP).
We also assume that a patient exists in one of three states
at a given moment with respect to a particular vital sign. At
any given time, a patient’s health status sign would be good,
fair, or critical. A patient’s health status is treated as good if
the vital signs are stable and within normal limits. A patient’s
health status treated as fair if the vital signs show slight in-
stability and the patient may be uncomfortable. For a patient
whose vital sign data are unstable and not within normal lim-
its, the patient’s status is treated as critical.
4. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we present our proposed framework that en-
ables the transmission of telemedicine data over multiple
wireless interfaces on a PWH. Figure 2 shows the various
components of the PWH that enable the PWH to trans-
mit the telemedicine data which are compromised of au-
dio, video, images, and vital sign data. The basic idea behind
the proposed framework is as follows. The data diﬀerentia-
tor module performs the determination of status. The patient
has diﬀerent rate, delay, and security requirements based on
his status. As a result, the bandwidth and security require-
ments of the vital sign data flows should be varied depending
on the status of the patient. The proposed framework per-
forms bandwidth and security adaption to meet the QoS and
QoP of the telemedicine applications. The proposed frame-
work treats the status of each vital sign distinctly, that is, a pa-
tient’s status can be FAIR with respect to heartbeat reading,
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whereas it can be GOOD with respect to blood pressure at
the same time. This allows the classifier module of the frame-
work to give higher priority (static priority) to CRITICAL
and FAIR flows over GOOD flows and thus provide better
QoS to more urgent flows.
Although the assignment of a static priority based on
the status of a flow allows the transmission of more urgent
flows first, diﬀerent flows of the same status can achieve dif-
ferent delays when they are transmitted on diﬀerent wireless
channels. Therefore, it becomes essential to prioritize further
among flows of the same status based on their delay perfor-
mance. To achieve this, the scheduler module assigns a dy-
namic priority to each flow based on its delay performance.
The dynamic priority of all flows is set to 0 at their initia-
tion. If the number of delay violations of a flow fi exceeds
the threshold DT1i, then the flow’s dynamic priority is in-
cremented by 1. Simply increasing the dynamic priority of a
given flow in an unbounded manner will aﬀect the perfor-
mance of other flows with the same status. To address this
issue, we reduce the strength of the security, thereby reduc-
ing the delays caused by the security schemes that are part of
the end-to-end delay of a packet. Therefore, if the number of
delay violations of flow fi exceeds the threshold DT2i, then
the security level of a flow is reduced by 1 as long as such a
reduction is possible.
The total priority of a flow is determined by summing
up both the static priority and dynamic priority. The flows
are then sorted in nondecreasing order of their total prior-
ity. Since the PWH can transmit the data on multiple wire-
less interfaces over multiple wireless networks, the wireless
channel with the lowest end-to-end delay among the avail-
able set of channels is determined. The head-of-line packet
of a flow with highest priority is sent on the channel with
the lowest end-to-end delay. The channel allocator module re-
ceives the delay feedback of each packet from the network
and provides that information to the delay monitor module.
The delay monitor computes the average delay, which is used
by the scheduler module in determining the dynamic priority
of packets of a flow.
The overall operation of the algorithm that executes on
the PWH is shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm takes as its
input the data from various sensors, audio and video sources.
Reference values REFi that represent the value used as refer-
ence for vital sign i are also given as input. A set of thresh-
olds VTi and NCTi for each vital sign i is also given as an
input to the algorithm. These thresholds are used to moni-
tor the changes in patient’s health conditions with respect to
a particular vital sign. The value of these thresholds is usu-
ally set by a doctor at the healthcare center. A pairwise key
exists between the PWH and the healthcare center. Since the
algorithm that runs on the PWH adapts the security levels
to meet delay and other QoS requirements, the security al-
gorithm is used and the strength of the encryption key is ex-
changed between the PWH and the healthcare center using
this pairwise key.
The algorithm uses two counters ecounti and ncounti.
Counter ecounti counts the number of times that vital sign
value i exceeds the reference value, whereas ncounti counts
the number of times that vital sign value i does not exceed
the reference value. The counters are all initialized to 0 on
Lines 1 and 2. Lines 5 to 26 update the status of a patient’s
vital sign based on the values of ecounti and ncounti. The
current value of vital sign is obtained on Line 6. On Lines 7
and 8, the value of ecounti is incremented if the current value
of vital sign is greater than the reference value. Otherwise, the
value of ncounti is incremented on Lines 9 and 10. The status
of the patient’s vital sign i is changed to CRITICAL when the
value of [ecounti/(ecounti + ncounti)] exceeds the threshold
VTi. Lines 13 to 16 handle the case when the patient’s status
with respect to vital sign i changes to CRITICAL. On Line
16, the PWH sends instructions to the body sensor network
to update the period of measurement and security for vital
sign i. Lines 18 to 20 handle the case when the patient’s sta-
tus with respect to vital sign i changes to FAIR. In this case,
the patient still does not have CRITICAL data to transmit,
but predicts the amount of additional bandwidth that would
be required in case the patient enters into the CRITICAL
state. This is done on Line 20. Lines 22 and 23 handle the
case when the patient’s state is GOOD. In this case, any addi-
tional bandwidth that was reserved in the FAIR state or used
in the CRITICAL state is made free. Procedure SCHEDULE()
is then called to schedule the packets on wireless channels.
The motivation behind reserving the additional band-
width only in case of a patient’s state becoming FAIR or
CRITICAL is as follows. Under most circumstances, the
PWH needs to send regular measurements from the body
and send it to the healthcare center. The bandwidth re-
quired for this data is predictable and therefore it can be
reserved ahead on these networks without incurring any re-
source wastage. Under CRITICAL situations, the PWH needs
to send more measurements and even detailed images au-
dio and video to the healthcare center. These applications re-
quire higher bandwidth and since they occur in such a spo-
radic fashion, reserving the resources for them all the time
would cause huge wastage of resources. On the other hand,
not reserving any bandwidth will decrease the probability of
obtaining the additional bandwidth by a patient in a CRITI-
CAL situation. Therefore, in order to provide a tradeoﬀ be-
tween the above two cases, we start reserving the bandwidth
when the patient’s state becomes FAIR with respect to to a
vital sign. The amount of reservation can be modified based
on the predicted amount of bandwidth required and the
probability of moving from the FAIR state to the CRITICAL
state. This reduces the resource wastage and also increases
the chances of obtaining bandwidth when the patient is in
CRITICAL state. In Section 5, we present an algorithm that
reduces the probability of call blocking when medical calls
request additional bandwidth.
Procedure CLASSIFY is shown in Algorithm 2. The pro-
cedure checks if the flow has already been classified on Line
1. If the flow is not classified, it is assigned a security level on
Lines 2 to 8. PRIO1, PRIO2, PRIO3 are integers such that
PRIO1 < PRIO2 < PRIO3, and s1, s2, s3 are security levels
such that s1 < s2 < s3. The security level assigned to a flow is
higher when the flow is in GOOD state. In CRITICAL situ-
ation, security level is reduced to meet other important QoS
requirements such as delay. On Lines 11 to 16, the procedure
assigns a static priority to each vital sign data flow. The vital
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Figure 2: Modules that constitute a PWH. Operation of the PWH.
sign data i that is CRITICAL state is assigned a higher value
of static priority spi.
Procedure SCHEDULE shown in Algorithm 3 assigns a
dynamic priority to the packet flows based on the delay viola-
tions and computes the total priority. The dynamic priority is
initially set to zero and is incremented if the delay violations
exceed threshold DV1i on Lines 1 and 2. If the delay viola-
tions exceed threshold DV2i, the security level of the flow is
reduced to better meet the delay requirements. In this case,
the dynamic priority is reset to zero. This procedure also de-
termines the channel that is allocated to each packet. On Line
13, packet p with the maximum priority api is determined.
On Line 14, the channel c with lowest delay is determined.
The packet p is sent on channel c on Line 15. The delay feed-
back is obtained and sent to the delay monitor. The delay
feedback is used in determining the dynamic priority.
5. CALL ADMISSION CONTROL
We now present the dynamic channel allocation algorithm
that is invoked whenever bandwidth is not available to sat-
isfy a medical data call request for emergency data in a cellu-
lar network. The dynamic channel allocation algorithm pre-
sented here dynamically requests and migrates bandwidth
from neighboring base stations. The base stations are respon-
sible for bandwidth allocation. The load on all base stations is
not going to be uniform. Also, every possible attempt should
be made in order not to drop a medical data call. Therefore,
a dynamic and adaptive channel allocation scheme is essen-
tial, where channels are shared dynamically by various base
stations of the same network access technology by adapting
to the requirements of the clients.
We present the following scenario that would require the
transmission of medical video/images. Consider a patient
who is under NORMAL circumstances. Only vital sign data
such as ECG data are transmitted from the patient to the
healthcare center. However, when the patient is in a CRIT-
ICAL state, he will probably be taken to the hospital in an
ambulance. In this situation, high bandwidth data such as
diagnostic medical images and videos need to be transmitted
from the patient to the healthcare center. These data can be
acquired either on an ambulance or by the patient himself
using a camera. However, the focus of this paper is not about
data acquisition. The transmission of these high bandwidth
data without violating their QoS requirements requires the
reservation of additional bandwidth.
The adaptive channel allocation algorithm presented in
the paper achieves this by reserving additional bandwidth
whenever it detects a change in the patient’s state from
GOOD to FAIR. The bandwidth is reserved for all medi-
cal data calls, and any medical data call can make use of
this bandwidth reservation. This reservation is also done not
just in the current cell, but also in the neighboring cells.
This reduces the call blocking and call dropping probabilities
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Input: A PWH with multiple network interfaces receives medical data from body sensors of the patient and other sources
such as video and audio. A set of REFi values that denote the reference values for each vital sign i. A set of thresholds
VTi and NCTi for each vital sign i. Threshold VTi represents the minimum number of times that vital sign value i
has to exceed the reference value REFi for that vital sign status to be changed to CRITICAL. Threshold
NCTi represents the minimum number of times that vital sign value i has to be below the reference value REFi for
that vital sign status to be changed to GOOD from CRITICAL. Pairwise key between PWH and healthcare center.
Output: Medical data packets are assigned channels on appropriate network interfaces based on the channel conditions,
QoS requirements, and urgency of the medical data packet.
begin
(1) ecounti ← 0 for all i.
(2) ncounti ← 0 for all i.
(3) P ← PINIT, where PINIT is the initial periodicity of measurement for vital sign data from the body sensors.
(4) for every period do
(5) for every vital sign i do
(6) curri ← current value of vital sign data i.
(7) if (curri > REFi) then
(8) ecounti + +.
(9) else
(10) ncounti + +.
(11) end if
(12) if (ecounti/(ecounti + ncounti) > VTi) then
(13) statusi ← CRITICAL.
(14) Get data from external sources.
(15) Call CLASSIFY(i, CRITICAL).
(16) Decrease period P.
(17) else if (curri > REFi) AND (ecounti/(ecounti + ncounti) ≤ VTi) then
(18) statusi ← FAIR.
(19) Call CLASSIFY (i, FAIR).
(20) Make additional bandwidth reservation ri.
(21) else
(22) statusi ← GOOD.
(23) Call CLASSIFY (i, GOOD).






Algorithm 1: Algorithm PWH.
of high bandwidth telemedicine applications. The reduc-
tion in call blocking and dropping probabilities ensures that
telemedicine applications do not experience any variation in
QoS achieved.
The adaptive dynamic channel allocation (ADCA) algo-
rithm presented in this section does the channel allocation
to a medical or a nonmedical call. A base station uses a dif-
ferent frequency, time slot, or code for each connection with
a client. We also assume that each BS knows its neighboring
BSs, that is, the network is already established and it remains
fixed. The base stations do not move, however the wireless
clients can move from the coverage area of one base station
to another. The ADCA scheme proposed supports both med-
ical and nonmedical traﬃc. It is possible that some of base
stations may become more loaded than the others. In such
a situation, some channels have to be transferred from one
base station to another.
The basic steps of the adaptive dynamic channel alloca-
tion (ADCA) algorithm are presented next. On Line 2, each
base station computes and sends its call blocking probabil-
ity for medical and nonmedical calls to all of its neighbors.
Based on the knowledge of its own call blocking probabilities
and of that of its neighbors, on Line 3, each base station de-
termines whether a request can be made to borrow channels
from any of the neighboring nodes. Based on the determina-
tion, neighboring channels are requested. If this base station
receives a channel borrowing request from the neighboring
node, it first checks if the number of free channels under the
base station is greater than the threshold of free channels. If
so, an appropriate free channel is moved from the base sta-
tion to the requesting neighbor on Line 5. On Lines 6 to 9,
a channel is allocated to a medical call. A medical call is as-
signed a channel as long as there are free channels available.
On Lines 10 to 13, a channel is allocated to a nonmedical call.
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Input: Flow id fi of the vital sign data i and statusi of the patient w.r.t vital sign i. CLASSIFIEDi is FALSE for all flows
initially. PRIO1, PRIO2, PRIO3 are integers such that PRIO1 < PRIO2 < PRIO3. s1, s2, s3 are security levels such
that s1 < s2 < s3.
Output: Assigns a static priority spi to flow i based on the statusi of the vital sign i of the patient.
begin
if (CLASSIFIEDi == FALSE) then
(2) CLASSIFIEDi ← TRUE
if (statusi == CRITICAL) then
(4) securityi ← s1.
else if (status == FAIR) then
(6) securityi ← s2.
else
(8) securityi ← s3.
end if
(10) end if
if (statusi == CRITICAL) then
(12) spi ← PRIO3.
else if (status == FAIR) then
(14) spi ← PRIO2.
else
(16) spi ← PRIO1.
end if
end
Algorithm 2: Procedure CLASSIFY.
Input: Static priorities spi assigned by classifier and the delay feedback dfi from the delay monitor. Two delay violation
thresholds DV1i and DV2i, such that DV1i < DV2i. Dynamic priority of each flow dpi is initially set to zero.
Output: Computes aggregate priority api by adding a dynamic priority to the static priority of each packet.
begin
if (dfi > DV1i and (dfi ≤ DV2i)) then
dpi + +.
(3) else if (dfi > DV2i) then
if (securityi > s1) then
securityi −−;
(6) dpi ← 0.
end if
else




api ← spi + dpi for all i.
while there are unscheduled packets and unassigned channels do
(15) Determine the packet p with the maximum priority api.
Determine the channel c with the lowest delay.
Send packet p on channel c.
(18) Determine one-way delay pth delay for packet p from the PWH to the healthcare center based on the feedback
received from the healthcare center.
Send pth delay to the Delay Monitor; The Delay Monitor updates a database of average pth delays as delay feedback
dfi for each vital sign data flow fi.
end while
end
Algorithm 3: Procedure SCHEDULE.
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Input: A wireless network has N channels and M base stations. Initially, each BS is assigned an equal number of channels.
Output: Based on the blocking probabilities of medical and nonmedical calls, channels are dynamically assigned among BSs.
Channels are allocated to reduce the blocking and dropping probabilities of medical calls.
begin
(1) for each base station, BSi do
(2) base station BSi first computes the blocking probabilities of medical and nonmedical calls and sends
this information along with the list of occupied channels to the neighboring base stations.
(3) Using the information of blocking probabilities in the local and the neighboring base stations, base station BSi decides
whether a request should be made to move an appropriate free channel from neighboring base stations,
and then implements its decision.
(4) if (number of free channels under base station, BSi > TFC) and (a neighboring base station requests a free channel)
then
(5) An appropriate free channel is moved from base station BSi to the neighboring base station requesting a free channel.
(6) else if (a medical data call arrives) then
(7) if (a free channel is available) then
(8) Assign a free channel to the medical data call.
(9) end if
(10) else if (a nonmedical data call arrives) then
(11) if (number of free channels under base station BSi ≥ TGC) then





Algorithm 4: Algorithm ADCA.
A nonmedical call is allocated a channel only if the number of
free channels is greater than the threshold of guard channels,
TGC.
The ADCA algorithm makes use of two thresholds while
assigning channels to a patient data or a nonpatient data
call. This is similar to the scheme used in our earlier work
[36] where the purpose of the two thresholds is to reduce
the handoﬀ call dropping probability. In this paper, the ob-
jective is to ensure low call blocking probability for patient
data calls. Every base station maintains two thresholds, TFC
and TGC, where TFC is the threshold of free channels and
TGC is the threshold of guard channels for medical data calls
(TFC > TGC). Every base station periodically sends the call
blocking probabilities of patient and nonpatient calls to its
neighbors. A nonmedical call is assigned a channel only when
the number of free channels under the base station is greater
than TGC, that is, TGC number of channels is always re-
served for patient data calls. In situations when a patient data
call cannot be allocated a channel even from the set of guard
channels, the algorithm attempts to transfer a channel from a
neighboring base station. A base station is allowed to transfer
a channel only when the number of free channels under that
base station is greater than TFC. Since TFC is greater than
TGC, this transfer of channels does not aﬀect the call block-
ing probability of patient data calls under the base station
that transfers the channels.
6. SECURITY WITH BIOMETRICS IN BSN
This section presents the algorithm SKEA to securely estab-
lish symmetric keys between the body sensors of BSN and
PWH. The main concern when dealing with security within
sensor networks is to securely generate and distribute the ses-
sion key for secure communication. In this regard, we first
state our assumptions.
6.1. Assumptions
(1) At the point of deployment, the body sensors are em-
bedded with a common global key, KCG, and authen-
ticated at a secure place. This key is assumed not to
be compromised at the start. This key is initially used
to set up the session key at a secure place and then
deleted. New current common global key can be estab-
lished using the key chaining using reconciliation phase
proposed.
(2) The biometrics used to establish the session key pro-
vide good degree of randomness so that an attacker
would not be able to guess it and compromise the se-
curity of the system.
(3) A body sensor is assumed not to be compromised
when initially attached to the patients body.
(4) The matching of two biometric signals is based on the
confidence value used. In this paper, we assume a con-
fidence value of 90%.
(5) An intruder either eavesdrops or injects false data but
cannot physically destroy the body sensor.
6.2. Source authentication
Whenever a sensor sends some information to the PWH, the
source of the data needs to be authenticated to make sure that
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an intruder is not forging the data. We propose the use of
physiological signals from the biometrics along with a voting
mechanism to achieve the same. After establishment of a se-
cure session key, we need to provide data confidentiality and
data integrity for the transmitted data from the body sensors
to the PWH. We can provide data confidentiality by encrypt-
ing the data with the session key established. To provide data
integrity, we use HMACS with a key as an input. To make it
more secure from intruders, the key used for data confiden-
tiality should be diﬀerent from the key used to establish data
integrity (to calculate the HMAC). Using this scheme, an in-
truder will need to have the knowledge of both keys in order
to spoof the PWH.
6.3. Using ECG signals
ECG sensors placed at diﬀerent places on the body send their
analog signals to the personal wireless hub (PWH) where
they are combined and only one ECG signal is produced.
Authors in [37] present the PQRST wave for an ECG signal
under normal and abnormal circumstances. Also in [38], au-
thors present a table with values of ECG signals under nor-
mal conditions and under hypertension. For a given patient
under normal circumstances, an ECG signal exhibits the fol-
lowing characteristics [39].
(1) Normal characteristics of the P wave
(a) smooth and rounded
(b) no more than 2.5 mm in height
(c) no more than 0.11 sec in duration
(d) positive in leads I, II, aVF, and V2 through V6.
(2) Normal characteristics of the ORS complex
(a) normal duration of the QRS complex in an adult
varies between 0.06 and 0.10 second
(b) a normal Q wave is less than 0.04 second in du-
ration and less than 1/3 of the amplitude of the R
wave in that lead.
(3) Normal characteristics of the T wave
(a) slightly asymmetric
(b) T waves are not normally more than 5 mm in
height in any limb lead or 10 mm in any chest
lead; T waves are not normally less than 0.5 mm
in height in leads I and II.
At the time of deployment, the ECG signal of the pa-
tient is recorded under normal status and stored in the PWH.
For every subsequent ECG signal generated at the PWH, it is
compared with the stored ECG signal, and the decision re-
garding the status of the patient is made based on the com-
parison.
6.4. MAC and subMAC
Keyed-hash message authentication codes or HMACs are
used to ensure authenticity of the data received. We pro-
pose to use keyed MACs which in addition to providing data
authenticity also provide data integrity. The TinyOS data
packet structure [40] includes 29-byte payload. In the pro-
posed scheme, HMAC is calculated over the data to be trans-
mitted and the calculated HMAC is transmitted along with
the data. The calculated HMAC is 16 bytes long. Thus, us-
ing HMACs introduces communication overhead of 16 bytes
for every message transmitted. This kind of overhead is not
desirable in an already resource constraint body sensor. In
order to reduce the same, we propose the use of subMAC. A
subMAC is constructed by selecting some bits of an HMAC.
With the use of subMAC, we reduce the overhead by trans-
mitting only a part of the actual HMAC rather than the entire
HMAC. For calculation of keyed-hash MAC, we assume the
transmitter and the receiver have a shared common global
secret key, KCG.
To form a subMAC from an HMAC, certain bits are se-
lected. To select these bits, we assume that each sensor node
has the same pseudo random number generator (PRNG)
[41]. This generator is used to generate random numbers be-
tween 1 and 32. The sensor nodes initiate their PRNG using
their current global key as the seed. The sensor node Si first
computes the HMAC of the data using the current global key
KCG which is embedded into every sensor at the point of de-
ployment. To select certain bits from the HMAC, Si runs its
PRNG eight times which results in eight random numbers
between 1 to 32. Each random number indicates the index of
a bit location in HMAC, and the bits of those selected loca-
tions constitute the subMAC. The transmitter then sends this
subMAC to the intended receiver. To verify this subMAC, the
receiver similarly computes HMAC of received message and
runs its PRNG eight times with the current global key as the
seed to generate the subMAC. If the subMACs match, the
message is said to be authenticated by the receiver. There is a
tradeoﬀ with using subMACs. While transmitting less num-
ber of HMAC bits, we help reduce the transmission overhead
but at the same time we also compromise the security level in
terms of authentication strength. An intruder can more eas-
ily forge a 1 byte HMAC than a 16 byte HMAC. The desired
level of security can be achieved by running the PRNG more
number of times to select more of the HMAC bits to form the
subMAC. Hence the size of the subMAC is directly related to
the strength of the authentication process and the communi-
cation overhead. A balance needs to be achieved between the
desired security level and the transmission overhead.
6.5. Key chaining using reconciliation
It is assumed in the proposed algorithm that there exists a
common global key, KCG, which is available at the start of the
system. This key is used for secure communications between
the body sensors and PWH while establishing the session key.
Owing to security concerns, this common global key should
be changed from time to time in order to avoid any intruder
to compromise a node and get the value of the current com-
mon global key. This change is initiated by the PWH which
prevents any compromised node to forcefully change the cur-
rent common global key. We use the reconciliation scheme
[42] in order to derive the new common global key. Thus, in
order to establish a session key for every subsequent session,
the sensor and PWH use the current common global key.





Figure 3: Overlapping sensing region for key reconciliation.
Consider the scenario shown in Figure 3. We have two
sensors say S1 and S2 which detect the same event. These two
sensors can communicate with each other and zero in a se-
cret key based on the sensed event. In the proposed scheme,
the PWH requests two sensor nodes for their sensed biomet-
ric signals. Sensors S1 and S2, having their sensing regions
overlapping, send the sensed biometric signal to PWH. Upon
receiving the signal, PWH compares them with its original
signal and prepares the index where the signals match, that
is, they have a confidence value greater than 90%. PWH
encrypts these indices and sends them back to the sensors
where decryption takes place. Sensors upon reading the in-
dices send by the PWH, compute the new current common
global key which is used from next session onwards.
6.6. Algorithm SKEA
At the start, two body sensors say S1 and S2 perform mu-
tual authentication with PWH with the help of nonce(s) and
subMACs. Now say if sensor S3 wants to communicate with
PWH, it establishes a symmetric session key KS with PWH.
Any body sensor requesting for a session key communicates
with any other two body sensors which already have per-
formed mutual authentication with the PWH. Here we as-
sume that sensors S1, S2, and S3 have overlapping sensing
regions and can sense the same event or the same biomet-
ric signal. The steps for the same event are as follows and are
given in Algorithm 5.
Step 1. Sensor S1 sends its biometric reading H1 to the per-
sonal wireless hub (PWH) along with the subMAC of the
message.
Step 2. PWH on receiving the biometric reading calculates
the subMAC of the message to establish integrity of the mes-
sage. PWH then compares H1 with its predefined value and
stores the indices as I1 where they match (calculation of con-
fidence value). PWH then deletes this reference to make sure
that if the value of the biometric changes, it does not use the
old reference value. This reference value is changed dynami-
cally using the most recent data transmission from the body
sensor.
Step 3. Sensor S2 sends its biometric reading H2 to PWH
along with the subMAC of the message.
Step 4. PWH on receiving H2 calculates the subMAC of the
message to establish message integrity. It then checks the val-
ues at indices I1 and picks the indices where the values match
(calculation of confidence value).
Step 5. PWH sends these indices to all body sensors, and the
sensors pick up values at those indices which form the com-
mon session key. The selected keys are expanded in order to
form a 64-bit long session key.
Step 6. Sensors use this session key to communicate with
the PWH. Sensors also compute per sensor session key by
combining the common session key with the pairwise key es-
tablished during the initial authentication phase. In order to
hide data from other sensors, a sensor can use its per sensor
session key to communicate with the PWH.
Step 7. With the transmission of actual data, PWH keeps
storing the actual biometric signal measurement as the ref-
erence for establishment of the next session key as this stored
value will have a high correlation with the biometric reading
used by the sensor to establish the next session key.
6.7. Secure data transmission
Once a session key is securely established between the body
sensors and the PWH, the body sensors can use this session
key for transmitting the data securely to the PWH. The estab-
lished session key is known globally by all the body sensors
and the PWH. Each body sensor also establishes a pairwise
key with the PWH which is only known to the corresponding
sensor and the PWH. Each body sensor provides data con-
fidentiality by encrypting the data with the session key and
uses the pairwise key for data authentication.
6.8. Security analysis
The use of confidence values helps prevent forging of the
data. Using this value, PWH can make out if the message is
send by a legitimate sensor or an intruder. The use of con-
fidence values helps in reducing the crosstalk interference
among body sensors of diﬀerent subjects. The intermediate
session key established is based on both the confidence val-
ues and hence in order to forge this value, the intruder has to
compromise both nodes generating the confidence value.
Body sensors S1, S2, and S3 form a three-party commu-
nication scheme. In the proposed protocol, sensors S1 and S2
authenticate S3 using the biometric signal of S3. While estab-
lishing the intermediate session key, S1 and S2 authenticate
each other and finally S3 authenticates S2 using the original
nonce. Only sensor S1 is not authenticated by S3.
Considering a situation where one of these two body sen-
sors, either S1 or S2 gets compromised. If sensor S2 gets com-
promised, when it send its confidence value to S1, S1 look-
ing at its confidence value can establish if S2 is compromised
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Input: SID: ID of the body sensor which wants to communicate with PWH. Its length is 5 bits.
HID: Biometric signal sensed by sensor SID.
S1 and S2: Two sensors we assume to have already been authenticated by PWH.
KCG: System-wide symmetric key embedded at the point of deployment which is deleted after initial session key is established.
Its length is 64 bits.
Ki: Pairwise key between the body sensor and PWH established during initial authentication phase. Its length is 64 bits.
Vthreshold: Threshold to calculate the confidence value.
Output: KS: A session key of 64 bits is established between SID and PWH.
begin
(1) At body sensor S1 generates a random number, n1 to be used as a nonce for S1 and measure the biometric trait say H1.
(2) Prepare the message as [S1, PWHID,EKCG (H1 ⊕ K1,n1), subMACKCG (S1, PWHID,n1)] and send it to PWH.
(3) At body sensor S2 generates a random number, n2 to be used as a nonce for S2 and measure the biometric trait say H2.
(4) Prepare the message as [S2, PWHID,EKCG (H2 ⊕ K2,n2), subMACKCG (S2, PWHID,n2)] and send it to PWH.
(5) At PWH, decrypt the message from S1 and S2, calculate subMAC, and compare with the received subMACs from sensors
S1 and S2. Compare the received biometric trait, H1 and H2 with the reference biometric, Href to calculate the confidence
value, VConf. By comparing the three biometric readings, prepare indices where the three match.
(6) Prepare message [PWHID, S1,EKCG (indices⊕ K1,n1, PWHID), subMACKCG (S1, PWHID,n1,nPWH)] and send to S1.
(7) Prepare message [PWHID, S2,EKCG (indices⊕ K2,n2, PWHID), subMACKCG (S2, PWHID,n2,nPWH)] and send to S2.
(8) At S1 receive the message form PWH, decrypt using EK1 and extract the indices, nonce n1 and nPWH. Calculate and
compare received subMAC to establish data integrity.
(9) At S1 compare the received nonce with the one sensor S1 send in its original message to protect against replay attacks.
(10) if ((subMAC check ok) and (nonce matches)) then
(11) Calculate session key, KS by picking values at indices send by PWH from the biometric reading. Expand the session key
to make it into a 64 bit session key.
(12) end if
(13) At S2 receive the message form PWH, decrypt using EK2 and extract the indices, nonce n2 and nPWH. Calculate and
compare subMAC to establish data integrity.
(14) At S2 compare the received nonce with the one sensor S2 send in its original message to protect against replay attacks.
(15) if ((subMAC check ok) and (nonce matches)) then
(16) Calculate session key, KS by picking values at indices send by PWH from the biometric reading. Expand the session key
to make it into a 64-bit session key.
(17) end if
(18) At S1, calculate the per sensor session key KS1 = KS ⊕ K1.
(19) At S2, calculate the per sensor session key KS2 = KS ⊕ K2.
end
Algorithm 5: SKEA: symmetric session key establishment.
or not, and if compromised S1 can send a message to PWH
stating the compromised state of S2 and PWH can further
broadcast the same eliminating the body sensor S2 from any
further communications.
In a case where sensor S1 gets compromised, it will try to
send a compromised intermediate session key to PWH. Since
S2 is not compromised, it will send the correct intermediate
session key to S3. Now, since both sensor S3 and PWH will
compute diﬀerent session key, PWH upon receiving the mes-
sage from legitimate sensor, S3 will not be able to decrypt the
message and hence we can conclude that it was given a wrong
intermediate session key by sensor S1 concluding that it has
been compromised. PWH then can broadcast a message stat-
ing the compromised state of sensor S1 so that it can be ex-
cluded from any further communications.
In case that both the sensors S1 and S2 are compromised,
they can collaborate and send compromised intermediate
session key to both sensor S3 and the PWH. In such a case,
the security of the proposed scheme can be broken, but it is
highly unlikely that both the sensors chosen to form the in-
termediate session key are compromised as they previously
have been authenticated by the PWH.
7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
7.1. Blocking probability
We first evaluate the blocking probability of medical and
nonmedical data calls achieved by the proposed ADCA al-
gorithm. To evaluate the blocking probability performance,
a simulation environment consisting 20 serving nodes and
200 PWHs in an 1000 × 1000 meters area is used. The serv-
ing nodes and PWHs are distributed randomly. The coverage
area of each serving node is fixed at 150 meters. Each wireless
client associates itself to the nearest serving node. The traﬃc
that is oﬀered to the network has a uniform spatial distribu-
tion with Poisson arrival rates varying from 1 to 10 calls per
second and an exponentially distributed call holding time of
about 10 seconds. The data rate requirement of each call is
varied uniformly between 75 bits per second to 600 bits per
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second. To evaluate the proposed algorithms, multiple simu-
lation runs are performed.
The blocking probability of medical and nonmedical calls
is used as the performance metrics. These two metrics are
compared for diﬀerent values of TFC and TGC. The objec-
tive of the performance evaluation is to identify the impact
of TFC and TGC on the blocking probabilities at diﬀerent
loads and then to identify the best values of TFC and TGC
at each load so that the blocking probability of medical calls
is reduced significantly without aﬀecting the blocking prob-
ability of nonmedical calls much.
The blocking probability is calculated as the ratio of
dropped calls to the arrived calls in the entire network. The
proposed algorithm works for any network. For example, the
bandwidth resources that are transferred from one base sta-
tion to another are timeslots in the case of a GSM network,
whereas they are CDMA codes in the case of a WCDMA
or CDMA-2000 network. Thus the algorithm is very generic
and can be applied to any network that partitions bandwidth
based on timeslots, codes, or frequencies.
Figure 4 shows blocking probabilities of nonmedical calls
against oﬀered traﬃc load for diﬀerent values of TFC and
TGC. For almost all of the values of TFC and TGC, the
blocking probability remains low at very low loads of about
20 erlangs and it starts to increase significantly after that and
stays almost constant and close to 1 after that. Call blocking
probability is the highest when TFC and TGC are high and is
low for lower values of TGC. Figure 5 shows blocking proba-
bilities of medical calls against oﬀered traﬃc load for diﬀer-
ent values of TFC and TGC. The value of call blocking prob-
ability for medical calls is minimum when TFC and TGC are
large, that is, 0.9. This is because of reserving channels for
medical calls, and allowing a higher value of TFC allows less
channels to be borrowed from neighbors. Also it is evident
from the figure that TGC aﬀects the blocking probability of
medical calls more than TFC. For the same value of TGC,
a higher value of TFC results in lower call blocking proba-
bility. Figure 6 shows the traﬃc blocking probability against
oﬀered traﬃc load. The reason for showing the traﬃc block-
ing probability is because unlike conventional systems, the
calls here have diﬀerent rates and so blocking a call does not
directly correspond to a proportional amount of traﬃc to be
blocked.
7.2. Average delay and delay violations
Figure 7 shows the average delay experienced by the pack-
ets. The proposed scheme in this paper is labeled as PWH
and is compared with earliest delay path first (EDF) algo-
rithm. The EDF algorithm schedules the packet with the ear-
liest deadline on the channel with the lowest delay. As can
be seen from the figure, the proposed scheme achieves lower
delay than the earliest-deadline-first policy. The adaptive se-
curity scheme allows the AHM scheme to achieve lower de-
lay than the EDF scheme. Figure 8 shows the delay viola-
tions experienced by packets. The delay deadline is set to
500 milliseconds. Again, because of the reduction in the en-
cryption delay, AHP achieves lower delay violations than the
EDF scheme.
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Figure 4: Call blocking probability of nonmedical calls versus traf-
fic load.
























Call blocking probability of medical data calls
versus traﬃc load
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Figure 5: Call blocking probability of medical calls versus traﬃc
load.
7.3. Communication overhead for algorithm SKEA
The SKEA algorithm is simulated using TinyOS [40] and
PowerTOSSIM [43, 44]. The proposed SKEA algorithm uses
keyed MACs for authentication purposes. In particular, we
use MD5 [45] for calculating the keyed MAC with common
global key, KCG, which contributes to the communication
overhead. Thus owing to the use of subMACs for each mes-
sage, SKEA incurs an overhead of 1 byte. With the given pay-
load size of 29 bytes, the communication overhead is reduced
with the help of subMAC scheme from 16 bytes (without
using subMACs) to 1 byte or from 55.17% to 3.45% of the
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Figure 6: Traﬃc blocking probability of medical calls versus traﬃc
load.
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Figure 7: Average delay versus load.
payload size. With the use of keyed subMACs, we ensure data
integrity and authenticity with minimal overhead.
Comparing with ALARM-NET, we see that for providing
authentication only with a payload of 29 bytes, ALARM-NET
reports to have a percentage overhead of 115% [46]; whereas
using SKEA with subMAC of 1 byte we see an overhead of
3.45%. Figure 9 shows the percent overhead for ALARM-
NET and SKEA with variable subMAC sizes of 16, 8, and
1 byte.
7.4. Energy consumption for algorithm SKEA
Since body sensors have stringent power constraints, any
protocol designed for body sensors must use the available
energy eﬃciently. Our aim is to provide desired level of se-
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Figure 9: Message authentication percentage overhead (ALARM-
NET versus SKEA).
curity while utilizing the least amount of additional energy
as overhead. Energy consumption is a very important perfor-
mance metric for analysis of any security algorithm in wire-
less sensor networks. The SKEA algorithm is simulated using
TinyOS [40] and PowerTOSSIM [43, 44].
We now analyze the energy consumption overhead of
using HMAC authentication with SKEA protocol for the
symmetric key establishment phase. We simulate two sce-
narios, first in which we perform key establishment using
SKEA (with HMAC authentication) and the second key es-
tablishment using modified SKEA (without HMAC authen-
tication). We analyze the overhead that is caused by using
HMAC authentication in terms of energy consumption.
We calculate energy consumption in terms of CPU en-
ergy, radio energy, and total energy. The numbers for total
energy required per body sensor for 5, 10, and 15 sensors are
plotted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Total energy required per sensor to establish session key























Figure 11: Percentage energy overhead using SKEA—Symmetric
session key establishment (with and without HMAC authentica-
tion).
We observe that for all scenarios the total energy per
sensor node for using HMAC authentication with SKEA is
slightly higher (about 5%) than the case of not using HMAC
authentication. Thus the proposed algorithm provides data
integrity and authenticity using keyed MACs with a minimal
overhead of about 5% in terms of energy consumption.
The percentage overhead in terms of radio energy, CPU
energy, and total energy spent using the symmetric session
key establishment scheme with HMAC authentication in
SKEA is depicted in Figure 11. This figure shows that the
SKEA scheme with HMAC authentication results in an en-
ergy overhead of 4%–5% in terms of CPU, radio, and total
energy. But using keyed MAC, data integrity and authentic-
ity are supported and, therefore, the small overhead is justi-
fiable.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented channel allocation algorithm and
packet scheduling algorithms that collaborate with an adap-
tive security scheme. Since wireless channels exhibit highly
varying channel conditions and have limited capabilities,
mobile telemedicine applications in the proposed algorithms
take advantage of all the available wireless networks to be
able to meet their QoS requirements. The main feature of the
proposed priority assignment technique is to update priori-
ties dynamically and adapt security based on whether pack-
ets meet their delay over networks with diﬀerent characteris-
tics. Due to the importance of patient calls, base stations of
wireless networks reserve some channels for patients calls de-
pending on those thresholds that can cause minimal degra-
dation in performance for nonpatient calls. The paper uses
data diﬀerentiation to determine the status of the patient and
predict the additional bandwidth that may be required by
the patient in future. Using this scheme, the paper provides a
higher channel availability for emergency medical data with-
out reserving the network resources all the time.
This paper has also presented an energy eﬃcient key es-
tablishment scheme SKEA for body sensor networks. SKEA
uses biometric signals to generate a session key. The scheme
uses keyed message authentication codes for authentication
purposes. The use of biometrics to generate the session key
eliminates the need of computationally expensive key gen-
erating functions. Moreover, biometrics reduces crosstalk in-
terference between diﬀerent subjects and avoids possibility of
reflection attacks in a challenge-response protocol.
REFERENCES
[1] J. R. Ga´llego, A. Herna´ndez-Solana, M. Canales, J. Lafuente,
A. Valdovinos, and J. Ferna´ndez-Navajas, “Performance analy-
sis of multiplexed medical data transmission for mobile emer-
gency care over the UMTS channel,” IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Technology in Biomedicine, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 13–22,
2005.
[2] S. Cherukuri, K. K. Venkatasubramaniam, and S. K. S. Gupta,
“BioSec: a biometric based approach for securing communi-
cation in wireless networks of biosensors implanted in the hu-
man body,” in Procedings of the 32nd International Conference
on Parallel Processing Workshops (ICPPW ’03), p. 432, Kaohsi-
ung, Taiwan, October 2003.
[3] C. C. Y. Poon, Y.-T. Zhang, and S.-D. Bao, “A novel biomet-
rics method to secure wireless body area sensor networks for
telemedicine and m-health,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 73–81, 2006.
[4] November 1995, Cryptographic Random Numbers Standard
P1363: Appendix E.
[5] US National Library of Medicine, “Mediline plus medi-
cal encyclopedia,” http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
encyclopedia.html.
[6] H. Holma and A. Toskala, WCDMA for UMTS, John Wiley &
Sons, New York, NY, USA, 2002.
[7] S. Mangold, S. Choi, P. May, O. Klien, G. Hiertz, and L. Stibor,
“IEEE 802.11 e wireless LAN for quality of service,” in Proceed-
ings of the EuropeanWireless, vol. 18, pp. 32–39, Florence, Italy,
February 2002.
[8] A. Ghosh, D. R. Wolter, J. G. Andrews, and R. Chen, “Broad-
band wireless access with WiMax/802.16: current performance
benchmarks, and future potential,” IEEE Communications
Magazine, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 129–136, 2005.
[9] A. Bhargava, M. F. Khan, and A. Ghafoor, “QoS management
in multimedia networking for telemedicine applications,” in
Narasimha Challa et al. 17
Proceedings of the 1st IEEE Workshop on Software Technologies
for Future Embedded Systems (WSTFES ’03), pp. 39–42, Hako-
date, Hokkaido, Japan, May 2003.
[10] P. Nanda and R. C. Fernandes, “Quality of service in
telemedicine,” in Proceedings of the 1st International Conference
on the Digital Society (ICDS ’07), p. 2, Guadeloupe, French
Caribbean, January 2007.
[11] I. Reljin and B. Reljin, “Telecommunication requirements in
telemedicine,” Annals of the Academy of Studenica, vol. 4, pp.
53–61, 2004.
[12] W. Luh, D. Kundur, and T. Zourntos, “A novel distributed pri-
vacy paradigm for visual sensor networks based on sharing
dynamical systems,” EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal
Processing, vol. 2007, Article ID 21646, 17 pages, 2007.
[13] Y. Chu and A. Ganz, “A mobile teletrauma system using 3G
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in
Biomedicine, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 456–462, 2004.
[14] C. Chigan and V. Oberoi, “Providing QoS in ubiquitous
telemedicine networks,” in Proceedings of the 4th Annual IEEE
International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Com-
munications Workshops (PerCom ’06), pp. 496–500, Pisa, Italy,
March 2006.
[15] A. Qureshi, A. Shoeb, and J. Guttag, “Building a high-quality
mobile telemedicine system using network striping over dis-
similar wireless wide area networks,” in Proceedings of the
27th Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering
in Medicine and Biology Society (EMBS ’05), pp. 3942–3945,
Shanghai, China, September 2005.
[16] G. Cheung, P. Sharma, and S.-J. Lee, “Striping delay-sensitive
packets over multiple bursty wireless channels,” in Proceed-
ings of the IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and
Expo (ICME ’05), pp. 1106–1109, Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands, July 2005.
[17] A. Qureshi and J. Guttag, “Horde: separating network strip-
ing policy from mechanism,” in Proceedings of the 3rd Interna-
tional Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services
(MobiSys ’05), pp. 121–134, Seattle, Wash, USA, June 2005.
[18] K. Chebrolu and R. R. Rao, “Bandwidth aggregation for real-
time applications in heterogeneous wireless networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 388–403,
2006.
[19] K. Chebrolu and R. R. Rao, “Communication using multiple
wireless interfaces,” in Proceedings of the Wireless Communica-
tions and Networking Conference (WCNC ’02), vol. 1, pp. 327–
331, Orlando, Fla, USA, March 2002.
[20] D. Zhu, M. W. Mutka, and Z. Cen, “QoS aware wireless band-
width aggregation (QAWBA) by integrating cellular and ad-
hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the 1st International Confer-
ence on Quality of Service in Heterogeneous Wired/Wireless Net-
works (QShine ’04), pp. 156–163, Dallas, Tex, USA, October
2004.
[21] J. Luo, R. Mukerjee, M. Dillinger, E. Mohyeldin, and E. Schulz,
“Investigation of radio resource scheduling in WLANs cou-
pled with 3G cellular network,” IEEE Communications Maga-
zine, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 108–115, 2003.
[22] C. Doukas, I. Maglogiannis, and G. Kormentzas, “Advanced
telemedicine services through context-aware medical net-
works,” in Proceedings of the International Special Topics Con-
ference on Information Technology in Biomedicine (ITAB ’06),
Ioannina-Epirus, Greece, October 2006.
[23] HIPPAA, “Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act”.
[24] C. Karlof, N. Sastry, and D. Wagner, “TinySec: a link layer se-
curity architecture for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceed-
ings of the 2nd International Conference on Embedded Net-
worked Sensor Systems (SenSys ’04), pp. 162–175, Baltimore,
Md, USA, November 2004.
[25] V. Shnayder, B.-R. Chen, K. Lorincz, T. R. F. Fulford-Jones, and
M. Welsh, “Sensor networks for medical care,” Tech. Rep. TR-
08-05, Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass, USA, 2005.
[26] D. J. Malan, M. Welsh, and M. D. Smith, “A public-key infras-
tructure for key distribution in TinyOS based on elliptic curve
cryptography,” in Proceedings of the 1st Annual IEEE Commu-
nications Society Conference on Sensor and Ad Hoc Commu-
nications and Networks (SECON ’04), pp. 71–80, Santa Clara,
Calif, USA, October 2004.
[27] S.-D. Bao and Y.-T. Zhang, “A design proposal of security ar-
chitecture for medical body sensor networks,” in Proceedings of
the International Workshop on Wearable and Implantable Body
Sensor Networks (BSN ’06), pp. 84–87, Cambridge, Mass, USA,
April 2006.
[28] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, “A key-management scheme
for distributed sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communication Security, pp. 41–
47, ACM press, Washington, DC, USA, November 2002.
[29] J. Undercoﬀer, S. Avancha, A. Joshi, and J. Pinkston, “Secu-
rity for sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the CADIP Research
Symposium, Baltimore, Md, USA, October 2002.
[30] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and J. D. Tygar,
“SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks,” in Proceed-
ings of the 7th Annual International Conference onMobile Com-
puting and Networking (MobiCom ’01), pp. 189–199, Rome,
Italy, July 2001.
[31] V. Gupta, M. Millard, S. Fung, et al., “Sizzle: a standards-based
end-to-end security architecture for the embedded internet,”
in Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE International Conference on Per-
vasive Computing and Communications (PerCom ’05), pp. 247–
256, Kauai Island, Hawaii, USA, March 2005.
[32] 2003, IEEE Standard for Part 15.4: Wireless Medium Access
Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications for
Low Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs).
[33] July 2004, ZigBee Alliance Document 02130: Network Layer
Specification.
[34] S. Dagtas, G. Pekhteryev, and Z. Sahinoglu, “Multi-stage real
time health monitoring via ZigBee in smart homes,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 21st International Conference on Advanced Infor-
mation Networking and ApplicationsWorkshops (AINAW ’07),
vol. 2, pp. 782–786, Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada, May 2007.
[35] W. He and K. Nahrstedt, “An integrated solution to delay
and security support in wireless networks,” in Proceedings of
the IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference
(WCNC ’06), vol. 4, pp. 2211–2215, Las Vegas, Nev, USA, April
2006.
[36] H. C¸am, “A distributed dynamic channel and packet as-
signment for wireless multimedia traﬃc,” in Proceedings of
the IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Confer-
ence (WCNC ’00), vol. 3, pp. 1131–1135, Chicago, Ill, USA,
September 2000.
[37] J. S. Steinberg, S. Zelenkofske, S. C. Wong, M. Gelernt, R. Sci-
acca, and E. Menchavez, “Value of the P-wave signal-averaged
ECG for predicting atrial fibrillation after cardiac surgery,”
Circulation, vol. 88, pp. 2618–2622, 1993.
[38] B. Huang and W. Kinsner, “ECG signal compression and
analysis in long-term monitoring,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineer-
ing (CCECE ’99), vol. 2, pp. 797–800, Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada, May 1999.
18 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
[39] B. Aehlert, ECGs Made Easy, Mosby, Edinburgh, UK, 3rd edi-
tion, 2006.
[40] TINYOS, http://www.tinyos.net/.
[41] D. Seetharam and S. Rhee, “An eﬃcient pseudo random num-
ber generator for low-power sensor networks,” in Proceed-
ings of the 29th Annual IEEE International Conference on Local
Computer Networks (LCN ’04), pp. 560–562, Tampa, Fla, USA,
November 2004.
[42] S. Ozdemir and H. C¸am, “Key establishment with source cod-
ing and reconciliation for wireless sensor networks,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 25th IEEE International Performance, Comput-
ing, and Communications Conference (IPCCC ’06), pp. 407–




[45] R. Rivest, “The MD5 message-digest algorithm,” IETF RFC
1321, April 1992, ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1321.txt/.
[46] A. Wood, G. Virone, Q. Cao, et al., “ALARM-NET: wireless
sensor networks for assisted-living and residential monitor-
ing,” Tech. Rep. CS- 2006-13, Department of Computer Sci-
ence, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va, USA, 2006.
